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The Polycentricity of Climate Policy Blockage 
 
Abstract: 
This paper builds on recent research on polycentric governance and the Ecology of Games to 
understand climate politics in the United States. Complementing previous work from 2005-2009, we 
map out the ideological networks of political actors engaged in the climate policy network using data 
from the US Congress as an arena of symbolic interactions. Our analysis identifies polycentric sites 
of ideological congruence and conflict in the discourse network on climate change. Political actors 
from different levels and including several actor types formed multiple centers that became 
bipolarized between the 112th and 114th Session of the US Congress. This process took place in 
tandem with the increased participation of subnational actors in the polycentric system. By the 114th 
Session of Congress—during which the 2016 election took place—subnational policy actors, along 
with a diversity of other actors, contributed to an extremely polarized discussion of one of the 
central policies in the Obama Administration's Climate Action Plan: the Clean Power Plan. This 
finding is remarkable as the concept of polycentricity is usually normatively associated with policy 
innovation, rather than stagnation. Our longitudinal analysis demonstrates, using Discourse Network 
Analysis, how increased multi-level participation can be associated with policy blockage of 
progressive climate policies rather than enabling policy innovation. 
 
Declarations of Interest: None. 
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Introduction 
Before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which brought a climate skeptic into the White House, 
numerous studies had pointed to emergent subnational opportunities to fill what had been called a 
climate “policy void” at the federal level (Krane 2007:462; see also Jones 1991; Rabe 2007; Fisher 
2013). When a policy void exists, the literature on polycentric governance (Ostrom 2014:121, see 
also 2012; Cole 2011) would advise us that actors from multiple scales and levels in different 
subsystems step up in order to produce policy innovation (Jordan et al. 2015, 2018).  This research 
tends to promote  “the normative prescription that polycentric systems are more effective” (Berardo 
and Lubell 2019:7) and describes scenarios in which collective action dilemmas are overcome 
through the involvement of actors at different “centers” of a political system (Ostrom 2012, 2014). 
Instead of innovating, however, this policy void in the U.S. was filled by subnational actors 
seeking to block progressive climate policy. In this contribution, employ the methodology of 
Discourse Network Analysis to illustrate how polycentric governance sometimes produce adverse 
outcomes.  Specifically, we look at how actors from different levels get involved when the centers of 
a polycentric system are characterized by ideological conflict. In making this argument, we draw on 
the adjacent literatures of polycentric governance, the Ecology of Games, and network science. 
 
Polycentric Governance, Discourse Networks, and Policy Blockage 
Environmental politics are characterized by the involvement of multiple actors at different levels 
and in different parts of a political system (McGee and Jones 2019). In fact, network analysis has 
been applied numerous times to study the structure of the actor network in U.S. climate politics (e.g. 
Jasny, Waggle, and Fisher 2015). Here, we extend this line of research and update earlier analyses 
(Fisher, Leifeld, and Iwaki 2013; Fisher, Waggle, and Leifeld 2013) using the same methodology and 
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more recent data from 2011 to 2016 in order to show how this complex actor network was engaged 
in climate policy blockage primarily from subnational actors. 
The complexity of the actor network has often been characterized using the concept of 
polycentric governance.  In recent years, much of this research has focused on global climate politics 
and the Paris Agreement, which was signed in 2015 (see particularly Cole 2015; Gillard et al. 2017; 
Jordan et al. 2018; Morrison 2017; Oberthür 2016; Ostrom 2012; Spreng, Sovacool, and Spreng 
2016).  Polycentricity describes a situation in which multiple actors from different parts of a system 
interact to produce decentralized outcomes (Carlisle and Gruby 2017). Such a decentralized 
structure is regarded as beneficial because it overcomes the stalemate often incurred by hierarchical 
forms of organization (Jordan et al. 2018; Oberthür 2016), as well as collective action problems 
resulting in policy gridlock (Berardo and Lubell 2019; see also Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010). In 
short, decentralized forms of bargaining, developing shared understandings, and developing and 
implementing solutions with an involvement of actors at different levels and places in the respective 
political system are often viewed as a way to produce policy innovation (Carlisle and Gruby 2017; 
see also Cole 2015). Building on the influential work of Ostrom and her colleagues, this approach 
finds that “multiple benefits are created by diverse actions at multiple scales” (Ostrom 2014:121, see 
also 2012; Cole 2011). In other words, this research encourages the multi-level governance of 
climate change (for a full discussion, see Betsill and Bulkeley 2006). 
Studies view this shift to involve an evolution from formal, command-and-control 
government procedures and debates over deregulation to instances of collaborative governance of 
natural resources that reveal a complex web of state and non-state actors interacting at multiple 
scales (Cole 2015; Koontz et al. 2004; Oberthür 2016; see also Bodin 2017). Perhaps Oberthür best 
summarizes this perspective in his paper on the polycentricity of the climate regime after the Paris 
round of the climate negotiations (COP-21) in 2015. “A wealth of governance levels (local, regional, 
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national supranational, international), public and private actors and fora have become recognised as 
driving forces of climate action in their own right” (Oberthür 2016:10)   
This research highlights how sub-national and local environmental organizations are working 
among a much broader set of partners and exchange of ideas. Focusing in particular on the 
subnational level, research has assessed how, in light of the delayed response by national 
governments to global environmental issues such as climate change, many cities have implemented 
their own environmental protection programs. Rabe calls these efforts “races to the top” (Rabe 
2013; Rabe and Borick 2013; see also Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Bulkeley 2005). 
It is clear from this exposition that polycentric arrangements can be analyzed using tools 
from network science, which focus explicitly on the connections between different centers of a 
system, as well as their internal organization. The literature on polycentric governance from an 
Ecology of Games perspective has contributed to this line of research by focusing on the 
connections of localized actors through shared policy forums as an emergent complex social system 
(Berardo and Lubell 2019; García and Bodin 2019; Scott and Greer 2019; see also Lubell et al. 2010; 
Hamilton and Lubell 2018). A policy forum is an organization that connects a range of stakeholders 
and facilitates a multipartite exchange between the participating parties in order to produce 
decentralized policy solutions (Fischer and Leifeld 2015). The web of overlapping memberships in 
these forums shapes an evolving network with multiple centers, or clusters, in which power is 
exercised, outcomes are negotiated, and shared meaning is developed. 
However, in the Ecology of Games perspective on polycentric systems, the actual processes 
taking place at these different centers of the network largely remain a black box and can vary to a 
great extent across parts of the system (Fischer and Leifeld 2015). Carlisle and Gruby (2017) assert 
that while autonomy is a necessary precondition for different centers in a polycentric system, there 
are certain mechanisms that can be distinguished in the interplay of the different parts of a 
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polycentric governance system. From a network and complexity perspective, such complex, 
emergent outcomes are the consequence of interactions among different parts of a system. For a 
system to be characterized as a polycentric governance system, the mechanisms of competition, 
cooperation, conflict, and conflict resolution between the different centers need to be disentangled 
(Carlisle and Gruby 2017). At the same time, whether or not positive outcomes, or innovations, are 
produced by the system collectively or whether adverse outcomes, or blockage, are generated 
depends on the interplay of these different centers and is largely an empirical question.  Answering 
this question, Berardo and Lubell have identified the need for analysis of longitudinal data regarding 
how polycentric systems develop over time. 
We aim to contribute to this literature by focusing on the ways actors in U.S. climate politics 
link to each other and form centers that span multiple levels. Specifically, we look at the 
involvement of subnational actors and their contribution to amplifying policy conflict between 
different centers of the complex system while inducing a larger policy congruence within their 
respective centers. As there are no institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution in place across 
the different parts of the system, the result was policy gridlock, which contributed to the eventual 
termination of a central policy initiative, the Clean Power Plan. 
However, we propose to focus on an aspect of polycentric governance that has been 
neglected in favor of analyzing the overall structure of the complex network. Our contribution is to 
analyze the congruence and conflict among actors and the centers they form over time at the 
ideological, or symbolic, level. This approach enables us to map the sources of cooperation and 
conflict and how they lead to a polarized topology of the polycentric network over time. We 
specifically study the discourse network around climate change to understand the shared policy 
beliefs of actors, how they lead from multiple centers to polarized camps over time, and what role 
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subnational actors played in this process. Our analysis speaks directly to several claims made in the 
literature on polycentric governance: 
First, we address Lubell and Berardo’s (2019) claim that such systems need to be analyzed 
empirically, with the full force of network analysis and complexity science, to find out how they are 
structured and what they actually produce: innovation or blockage – rather than taking a positive 
outcome for granted, as the majority of work on polycentricity seems to imply (Lubell and Berardo 
2019). Indeed, we illustrate this point using a case where the involvement of actors from a different 
level is associated with adverse outcomes. 
Proposition 1: The involvement of actors from a different level can lead to adverse 
outcomes (policy blockage), rather than innovation, in a polycentric governance system. 
 
Second, we address the same authors’ claim that little empirical work has been done in a 
longitudinal fashion to evaluate how polycentric politics play out over time and how key actors can 
change the structure and hence overall outcomes of a system. To this end, we extend earlier analyses 
on the 109th and 110th Sessions of the U.S. Congress using the same methodology (Fisher, Leifeld 
and Iwaki 2013) by three additional time periods, the 112th, 113th, and 114th U.S. Congress, to 
understand how the new involvement of a set of subnational actors contributes to polycentricity and 
policy outcomes. 
Proposition 2: Only a longitudinal empirical perspective can document the changes in a 
polycentric governance system that lead to policy outcomes. 
 
Third, we operationalize some of the different mechanisms outlined by Carlisle and Gruby 
(2017) in their theoretical work on polycentric governance: we measure conflict and congruence 
between actors and their centers through a content analysis of their policy beliefs. This 
operationalization enables us to map cross-sectionally and over time what the different centers are in 
terms of their overlapping policy beliefs, who their members are, how they relate to each other 
ideologically, and how their evolution led to climate policy blockage by the end of the period under 
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study. The analysis demonstrates how there is actually a “structural hole” (Burt 1995) between 
centers in terms of policy belief congruence, which only widens with the increased participation of 
subnational actors on each side of the increasingly bipolar and less multipolar network. 
Proposition 3: Ideological congruence and conflict in discourse networks structure the 
(polycentric or bipolar) topology of a governance network, and this topology may be altered 
by cross-level involvement of new actors. 
 
This effort is a clear departure from the Ecology of Games perspective, which deals with the 
structure, rather than the contents, of the network. The Ecology of Games perspective provides 
insights into the generation of shared meaning through forums, but also into negotiations and 
multipartite exchange (Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010; Fischer and Leifeld 2015), but it does not 
unpack this black box. Our contribution, in contrast, provides a complementary perspective by 
focusing exclusively on the generation of shared meaning through policy belief congruence or 
conflict at the expense of the other types of exchange in policy forums. In other words, it opens the 
black box and uses actual belief relations to operationalize centers in a governance system.  The 
following analysis also focuses on a relatively specific, but important, arena of governance: the 
network of actors who are active on the national stage through their testimony in the U.S. Congress.  
 
Congressional Hearings as an Arena for Polycentric Governance 
Congressional testimonies provide direct accounts of the discourse and debate around climate 
policymaking, as well as the issue more broadly.  We build on the earlier studies by McCright and 
Dunlap (2003), Liu and colleagues (2011), as well as previous work by Fisher and colleagues (2013a, 
2013b), all of which analyze Congressional hearings to understand climate politics in the US.  
Congressional hearings are an important part of the policymaking process in the United States.  In 
the words of the United States Governmental Printing Office, Congressional hearings are the 
principal way that members of Congress “obtain information and opinions on proposed legislation, 
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conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government department or the 
implementation of a Federal law.”1 The importance of such hearings as a source of information has 
been noted within the academic literature as well (see particularly Clifton 2004; Gormley Jr 1998).   
An array of experts give testimony at Congressional hearings, including governmental agency 
officials, interest groups, businesses, think tanks, and academic researchers, as well as members of 
the US Congress themselves (for a more general discussion of congressional hearings, see Burstein 
and Hirsh 2007; DeGregorio 1998). Congressional hearings provide a forum for different policy 
actors to achieve recognition for their interests and perspectives, and to garner the attention and 
support of different political constituencies. Testimonies are intended to inform decisionmakers 
about a range of topics germane to the policy issue at hand.  According to Burstein and Hirsh, 
“members of Congress believe that hearings provide an efficient way to gather information and 
exert influence. […] Interest organizations, too, see hearings as important venues for conveying 
information” (Burstein and Hirsh 2007:179; see also Laumann and Knoke 1987).   
Congressional hearings, then, represent a field site wherein one can study how science, 
politics, and economic interests collide in ways that influence climate change policy, or the notable 
lack thereof.  Even though the rules of both houses of the US Congress stipulate that the minority 
party is given the opportunity to call witnesses at Congressional hearings, participation in hearings 
varies based on what party has the majority in Congress.  In the words of a report by the 
Congressional Research Service regarding the Senate practice, “typically, the members of a 
committee from each party work together informally to invite witnesses representing various views” 
(Heitshusen 2017:1; see Congressional Research Service 2015 on the House).   
The asymmetries that result from participation based on the majority rule, have been found 
also to have implications to the content of Congressional Hearings. Park and colleagues, for 
                                                          
1 https://www.govinfo.gov/help/chrg (Accessed 9 May 2019) 
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example, note that hearings on climate change are more likely to take place during a Democrat-
controlled Congressional session and such hearings tend to feature testimony from more pro-
environment political actors and mainstream scientists (Park, Liu, and Vedlitz 2010).  During 
Republican-controlled Congressional sessions, testimonies are more likely to focus on the negative 
implications of regulating carbon dioxide (2010).  In a more recent analysis, Fisher and colleagues 
find less polarization around the issue of climate change during the 110th Session of Congress, when 
the Democrats held the majority in the House of Representatives and the voting share in the Senate 
(Fisher, Leifeld, et al. 2013).  Even with these noted challenges, the perspectives presented during 
Congressional hearings provide a good data source for understanding the polycentric network 
engaged in this contentious issue.   
Building on the literature presented and the three propositions generated from it, this paper 
analyzes the content of Congressional hearings on climate change policy.  In so doing, we focus, not 
just on who has a say in the climate change debate in Congress, but what they are saying, and with 
whom they are aligning.  Our dataset includes all testimonies from hearings related to the issue of 
climate change during the 112th, 113t h, and 114th sessions of the US Congress (for a full discussion of 
the dataset, how it was assembled, and how data were analyzed, see methods supplement).  The 
112th (January 5, 2011-January 3, 2013) took place during the second half of President Obama’s first 
term.  The 113th Congress and 114th Congress (January 3, 2013-January 3, 2015 and January 6, 2015-
January 3, 2017) span the entirety of the second term of the Obama Presidency.  During the 112th 
and 113th sessions, there was a Democratic majority in the Senate and a Republican majority in the 
House of Representatives. During the 114th Congress, there was a Republican majority in both 
Houses of the Congress. 
These three sessions of Congress are particularly notable as they directly followed the failure 
of the cap-and-trade bill in the 111th Session of Congress(for discussion, see Jasny et al. 2015) .  
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Moreover, it was during these sessions of Congress that President Obama’s Clean Power Plan was 
released and debated.  President Obama formally announced the Clean Power Plan (CPP) in 2015,2 
calling the proposed regulation “the single most important step America has ever taken in the fight 
against global climate change” (Obama 2015). The policy aimed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
from power plants through an Executive Order that would be enforced by the EPA and 
implemented through various means on a state-by-state basis.  By adopting the domestic emissions 
reduction goals included in the CPP (32 percent within 25 years relative to 2005 levels), the Obama 
Administration was able to participate in the international climate negotiations in Paris at COP-21 
with the knowledge that it could follow through on its international commitments (for more details, 
see The New York Times 2017).  
Political opposition to the CPP was quickly apparent.  In some cases, states had, 
independent of the policy, already implemented plans for reducing emissions. Progress made by 
these states previous to the expected start date of the CPP was not expected to be counted toward 
their mandated goals.  Mere days after President Obama announced the Plan, governors and 
attorneys general from 27 states signed a letter announcing their intention to oppose it on the 
grounds that it was federal overreach into state affairs (Harvard Law Review 2016). In February 
2016, during the second half of the 114th Session of the Congress, the US Supreme Court stayed 
implementation of the Plan until the legal challenges to the program could be concluded (Harris 
2016).  The stay remained in effect until the Trump Administration replaced the policy after taking 
office. 
 
                                                          
2  The Clean Power Plan was first proposed by the Obama Administration in June 2014.  For details, see 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants_.html#rule-history  
(accessed 8 May 2019).  
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Data and Methods 
Content Coding 
We employ the methodology of previous studies to create a dataset from hearings during these three 
sessions of the US Congress (Fisher, Leifeld and Iwaki 2013; Fisher, Waggle and Leifeld 2013; for 
details, see methods supplement).  Consistent with this previous work on the subject, the 
testimonies were coded for ten concepts that are particularly relevant to discussions about climate 
change policy in the United States.  Coding involved noting whether the speaker agreed or disagreed 
with the specific concept. 
Two of the concepts were about the science of climate change, which has been a central 
theme in the climate change debate in the United States for many years: “climate change is real and 
anthropogenic” and “climate change is caused by greenhouse gases.”  The eight other concepts were 
about different climate policy issues/instruments: “legislation should regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions,” “legislation that regulates carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the economy,”  
“legislation should establish a market for carbon emissions (cap and trade),” “legislation should 
establish a carbon tax,” “the Federal government (not states) should take the lead on climate policy,” 
“Climate change (or failing to address climate change) poses a security threat,” “States should accept 
the Clean Power Plan,” and “The US should meet or exceed the 26%-28% emissions reduction 
target by 2025 against a 2005 baseline (per the Paris agreement).” With these concepts, we focus on 
what Sabatier and Weible  call ‘policy core beliefs’ as they are preferences regarding the key 
dimensions of a specific policy or the ‘glue that binds coalitions together’ (2007). Whenever a 
statement falling under one of the ten concepts was made, the statement was coded as either agree 
or disagree.  In some cases, statements included mention of both sides of the issue, suggesting that 
the speaker holds a moderate or ambivalent stance on the issue.  In these cases, the speaker was 
coded as both agreeing and disagreeing. The software Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld 2016) and 
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the rDNA R package (Leifeld 2019) were used to code the actor-concept statements and analyze the 
resulting networks. 
 
Network Analysis Technique 
The methodology and data collection are consistent with the procedures outlined in Fisher et al. 
(2013) and are summarized in our methods supplement.  A “statement” is a text portion where an 
actor reveals his or her policy beliefs or preferences in the text (Leifeld 2019; Leifeld and Haunss 
2012). All statements were transformed into an actor-by-concept matrix where each category 
occupies two distinct columns – one for positive statements, indicating the actor supports the claim, 
and one for negative statements, when the actor opposes it (i.e., reflecting agreement and 
disagreement with each concept). In network terminology, it can be understood as an affiliation 
matrix (also known as two-mode network or bipartite graph) with two classes of nodes: actors and 
concepts. To avoid confounding the quantity of an actor’s statements and the actor’s qualitative 
preferences, we dichotomized the affiliation matrix in some of the procedures that follow, retaining 
“0” values where present and replacing positive values by the value “1” (i.e., ignoring duplicate 
statements).  In the multivariate network procedures described below, this process guarantees that 
actors are modeled as showing a high degree of belief similarity if they judge many different 
concepts in the same way, not if they agree on a single concept repeatedly during Congressional 
Hearings. 
A full array of network-analytic methods can be used to analyze the ideological network. In 
our analysis, we employ network modularity (Newman 2006) and a cluster analysis to describe the 
network structure. We embed these into a qualitative interpretation of the network diagrams and the 
political process. More specifically, the data were analyzed in the following four related ways, with 
identical analyses for the three different sessions. 
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First, we conducted an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis (Jain and Dubes 1988) with 
Ward’s optimization (Ward 1963). This analysis serves to identify the community structure of the 
actors based on their stated policy beliefs. We employed the Jaccard coefficient to create a distance 
matrix from the actor-concept matrix. The resulting distance matrix was clustered in order to find 
subgroups of actors who held similar beliefs. The Jaccard coefficient is known to have normalizing 
properties in the sense that the number of statements made, or the number of beliefs held, does not 
affect the similarity to other actors. This procedure was chosen over three other nested clustering 
techniques based on the Jaccard distances and over four community detection techniques based on 
one-mode network data using the criterion of network modularity in the positive-valued one-mode 
network (see below). The results are presented as dendrograms, where the height at which two 
actors or groups of actors are merged together represents their distance in the Jaccard distance 
matrix. If two actors were merged at a relatively low level, they held relatively similar, or congruent, 
policy beliefs (see also Leifeld 2016). The order of actors merged at the same agglomeration height is 
random. Cluster membership in the dendrograms is denoted by different symbols next to the leaves 
(circles versus rectangles for the different clusters), while the colors of the node labels represent the 
nine actor types. Clusters of nodes in this network represent different centers in the polycentric 
governance system, based on the assumption that centers can be measured in terms of their 
similarity of policy beliefs. The discourse network is a good overall indicator of the empirical 
existence of centers, their between-group conflict or polarization, and their within-group congruence 
in US climate politics. The interpretation in the Results section below uses the actor types 
represented by node label colors to describe the different centers in terms of their actor composition 
and analyze the involvement of subnational actors. 
Second, we computed network modularity (Newman 2006) for each cluster solution in the 
positive-valued subtracted one-mode network (see below). In the cluster analysis, we chose two 
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clusters per Session of Congress because this corresponded to the expected polarization known 
from earlier studies (Fisher et al. 2013). Network modularity also confirmed that a solution with two 
clusters exhibited a better goodness of fit than solutions with three or four clusters. Modularity is a 
measure of the extent to which a network is characterized by multiple subgroups, i.e., a measure of 
fragmentation of the network into centers, given a partition of nodes into centers as computed by 
the cluster analysis. Modularity is defined between –0.5 and 1.0. Networks with high modularity 
(practically above 0.4) are characterized by a strong division into separate centers, where there are 
dense connections between the nodes within a center and sparse connections across different 
clusters (see Newman 2006 for details). 
Third, we visualized the actor-concept affiliation network as a signed bipartite graph, for 
each Session of Congress separately. In these networks, actors were represented by circles and 
concepts by rounded rectangles, and ties between an actor and a concept as lines, with positive 
referrals of a concept by an actor highlighted in green, negative referrals in red, and ambiguous 
relationships in blue. These visualizations show how the clusters in the dendrograms came about. 
With increasing complexity of the diagrams that have larger numbers of actors in later sessions, we 
decided to omit actor labels and types and highlight only the behavior of subnational actors in order 
to identify their role in the ideological networks and clusters more clearly. 
Fourth, we converted the actor-concept affiliation networks into one-mode actor networks 
and visualized these networks as well, using the transformations described in earlier work (Leifeld 
2016, 2017; Leifeld, Gruber, and Bossner 2018). We used the “subtract” method (Leifeld 2017) in 
the Discourse Network Analyzer software to express congruence between actors’ use of concepts in 
excess of actors’ conflicts over the ten concepts as follows: We first computed an actor congrence 
network. An actor congruence network contains only actors as nodes. The similarity between any 
two actors in terms of how many concepts they both referred to (i.e., both positively or both 
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negatively) is represented by weighted ties between the actors. The tie weights were normalized by 
dividing them by their incident actors’ average number of distinct concept referrals, in line with the 
previous work (see, in particular, Leifeld 2017). We then computed an actor conflict network, in 
which the tie weights between actors count how often they had different views on concepts (i.e., one 
actor referring positively to a concept and the other actor referring negatively to a concept). The 
conflict network was normalized in the same way as the congruence network, by dividing the tie 
weights by the average number of concepts the two actors involved in a tie referred to. Next, we 
subtracted the normalized conflict weights from the normalized congruence weights in order to 
create the one-mode network matrix in which positive ties indicate congruent actor beliefs in excess 
of conflict and in which negative ties indicate more conflict than congruence.  
In the final step, we replaced all negative values by zero in order to retain only high-
congruence ties between actors. This positive-valued subtracted network (Leifeld 2017) was used to 
compute modularity with a given cluster solution (see above). We also visualized the positive-valued 
subtracted network and highlighted clusters, or centers, of similar-minded actors using blue 
hyperplanes (as implemented in the graph drawing software visone). The community detection 
technique used for this purpose was the Louvain algorithm as a fast and reliable technique for 
weighted networks (Blondel et al. 2008) and as a complementary clustering technique to the 
hierarchical clustering outlined above. The visualizations with embedded cluster analysis show the 
polarization of the ideological network in each Session of Congress while retaining the actor labels. 
We interpreted the location and role of different actor types (indicated here by node color) and most 
notably subnational actors in the centers over time to assess their role in the polycentric governance 
system. 
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Findings 
On the pages that follow, we present the results of our analyses of Congressional hearings related to 
the issue of climate change in the 112th-114th Sessions of the US Congress to assess the degree to 
which our analyses support our three propositions.  We start by looking at the diversity of policy 
actors participating in these Hearings by actor type.  Then, we present dendrograms based on the 
cluster analysis of the affiliation networks along with the ideological maps of how political actors are 
tied together by common categories and stances and how positions in this network map are related 
to organizational affiliations of participants in these hearings, focusing on how they changed from 
the 112th to 114h sessions of the US Congress.  The interpretation will focus on the location of 
subnational actors with regard to what categories they co-support or co-reject and in which clusters 
they are located as a consequence of these choices. Finally, we present the one-mode actor networks 
for the same time periods to evaluate the resulting polarization and the subnational actors’ role in 
the network more clearly. 
 
Overall Participation in Congressional Hearings on Climate Change 
Building off the work by Burstein and Hirsh (2007), Gormley (1998), McCright and Dunlap (2003), 
as well as our previous work (Fisher, Waggle and Leifeld 2013), we analyze the types of actors who 
made statements during the Congressional hearings in our sample. Table 1 presents these results. 
Contrary to previous findings that scientists played a limited role in Congressional hearings on 
climate change (Fisher et al. 2013), scientists played a variable role in these hearings (about 29% in 
the 112th, 15% in the 113th Congress, and 7% in the 114th). Participation by scientists in the 112th 
Session of Congress right after the failure of the bill is particularly high.  The 112th session of 
Congress is also unique in the low levels of governmental participation from Congresspeople (about 
5% for Democrats and 4% for Republicans).  One likely interpretation of this finding is that, after 
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the failure of the cap-and-trade bill, Congressional representatives were less involved in the issue 
since there was no policy mechanism under debate.  As a result, scientists were called more 
frequently to speak in these Congressional Hearings. 
The distribution of the speakers from the 113th and 114th sessions of Congress is more 
consistent with previous analyses of Congressional Hearings, in that the majority of the speakers 
came from different branches of the US government.  Since the Obama Administration formally 
introduced the Clean Power Plan during the 113th session of Congress and then finalized it during 
the 114th session, it makes sense that participation in Congressional hearings would grow in general 
and among representatives of the US government more specifically. 
Beyond the varying levels of discussion around the issue of climate change, one of the most 
noteworthy differences in this analysis is the emergence of subnational actors playing an increasing 
role in these Congressional Hearings.  Although subnational participation in hearings in previous 
sessions of Congress was so low that it was included in the “Other” category (Fisher et al. 2013), 
about 10% of participants were subnational governmental representatives across these three 
Sessions of the US Congress (7% in the 112th, 12% in the 113th, and 9% in the 114h Session 
accordingly). 
The diversity of participation by various types of actors is consistent with the work on 
polycentric governance.  Moreover, the increase in subnational governmental participation and then 
its persistence over time suggests that, even in the US Congress, a polycentric approach is being 
taken to address climate change (Cole 2015; Ostrom 2012). 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Analyzing the Content of the Hearings 
Next, we present the results of analysis of the content of the testimonies presented in Congressional 
Hearings.  Here, policy actors are separated into clusters based on their similarity across the ten 
concepts that were identified as particularly relevant to climate politics in the US.  These results are 
graphically depicted as a dendrogram. 
Figure 1 presents the results of this analysis of the ten concepts together for the 112th, 113th, 
and 114th sessions of the US Congress.  Speakers within the 112th Congress separate out into two 
distinct “camps” in this analysis:  one dominated by scientists, environmental groups, and 
representatives from the Obama administration, which is denoted by rectangles on the right of the 
diagram; and the other dominated by business groups and think tanks, which is denoted by circles 
on the left.  Since the climate bill failed the previous session of the Congress, these findings show 
that two polarized camps exist on the issue, which is not a surprise. The modularity of the two-
cluster solution is 0.348, which is notable but not extremely high. Especially the cluster involving 
science, environment, and government is composed of multiple sub-groups, or sub-centers. 
Subnational actors are notably absent in this Session of Congress. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Turning to the 113th Congress, the dendrogram also separates into two distinct clusters:  
actors denoted with rectangles on the left and circles on the right.  All of the environmental groups, 
almost all of the representatives from the Obama Administration, and most scientists are in the 
cluster on the right (denoted by circles). All but one of the Republican Legislators in the debate and 
a number of businesses are in the cluster on the left (denoted by rectangles).  This cluster includes 
the vast majority of the sub-national actors who participated in the 113th session of the US Congress. 
This center includes representatives from four states who gave testimony to the US Congress during 
a hearing in September 2014 representing an opposition by states to the Clean Power Plan. The 
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modularity of the subtracted actor network given this two-cluster solution is 0.416, which marks an 
increase over the previous legislative period and indicates greater polarization with less clear-cut sub-
centers within the two factions than before. 
The debate in the 114th Session of Congress (where the Republicans held the majority of 
both houses) is still characterized by a bipolarization between the two camps, as expected. However, 
there are three notable differences. First, all of the Republicans and many businesses opposed to the 
Plan (denoted by circles on the left) is now of almost equal size as the Democrat, environmental, 
and science cluster (denoted by rectangles on the right). Second, the number of subnational actors 
has increased in absolute numbers (though not in relative shares; cf. Table 1). The number of 
subnational actors has grown in both camps, with fifteen subnational actors in the Republican 
cluster and six in the Democrat and environmental cluster. There continues to be a relative 
overrepresentation of subnational actors in the oppositional camp, as in the previous Session. Third, 
the two main clusters appear more congruent within and more divided across. This finding is 
confirmed by a high modularity value of 0.443, which is the highest among the three legislative 
periods. 
To provide a micro-level interpretation of the role of subnational actors in these clusters, 
Figure 2 shows the signed affiliation networks, from which actors’ stances on the ten concepts can 
be inferred. Actors are denoted by circles while concepts, or policy beliefs, are shown as squares. 
Green ties indicate a positive stance by an actor on a concept; red ties indicate a negative stance, and 
blue ties indicate both. 
In the 112th Congress, the most controversial concept is “Climate legislation will not hurt the 
economy.” The only subnational actor that is present in the debate in the 112th Congress—the Texas 
Attorney General—has a negative stance on this issue, meaning that he stated that climate legislation 
will hurt the economy. 
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the 113th Congress, most of the conflicts emerge around the categories “Climate 
legislation will not hurt the economy” (as before) and two categories specifically around the role of 
subnational actors: “The Federal government (not states) should take the lead on climate policy” and 
“States should accept the Clean Power Plan.” 
With increasing numbers of actors in the 113th Congress, the affiliation network visualization 
becomes harder to read. Figure 3, while otherwise identical to Figure 2, therefore highlights the role 
of subnational actors. Figure 3 reveals that subnational actors are much more active in the 113th 
Congress and that their main issue is the rejection of the Clean Power Plan in the 113th Congress. In 
other words, subnational actors team up to reject the Clean Power Plan in this debate.  
In the 114th Congress (Figure 3, lower diagram), the two concepts that engage subnational 
actors continue to be the most controversial issues. It is evident that the majority of subnational 
actors take a clear negative stance on the two issues, and a number of these actors co-rejects both 
categories. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analyzing the location of subnational actors in the “centers” of the debate 
Figure 4 presents a transformation of the affiliation networks shown in Figure3, where only actors 
and the excess congruence in terms of policy beliefs is shown (see methodology section for details). 
The tie strength (and line width) between two actors is proportional to the (normalized) number of 
policy beliefs the two actors both hold (i.e., counting both co-support and co-rejection, but not 
mixed stances) in excess of conflicts between the same two actors. Hence, this form of visualization 
operationalizes the different relations theorized by, for example, Carlisle and Gruby (2017) and 
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shows us where there is more congruence (a cooperative relation) than conflict between centers and 
sub-centers in the polycentric system. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
As in the dendrograms in Figure 1, one can see the two camps emerging in the debate, 
denoted by the blue hyperplanes, which show the result of a Louvain graph clustering procedure. 
With increasing time from the 112th to the 114th Session, the polycentric structure increasingly moves 
toward a clearly polarized two-center structure, which is in line with the modularity scores reported 
above. Only those actors who refer to three or more concepts are labeled in these figures. Node size 
corresponds to the number of relevant statements made by the respective actor. 
In this figure, it is easy to see how many of the subnational actors cluster together in the 
113th Congress and are adjacent to business actors and mostly Republicans (but also to some 
Democrats), which is mostly due to their stances on the Clean Power Plan (see Figure 3 for details). 
Looking at the 114th Congress, we see the increasing polarization across the two camps and the 
leading roles of Republicans and the US Chamber of Commerce on the one hand and Democrats, 
environmental NGOs, and the Obama-led Environmental Protection Agency on the other hand. 
Proportionally, more subnational actors are located in the former camp as they share their rejection 
of the Clean Power Plan and the notion that the federal government should lead on climate policy 
with the Republican and business actors.  As previously noted, more than half of the US states 
indicated their intention to challenge the Clean Power Plan when it was initially drafted, and 26 
states filed suit against the Obama Administration over the Plan.3  Many of these states were 
represented in the hearings about climate change during the 114th Session of Congress.   
Overall, Figures 1-4, and especially the one-mode networks in Figure 4, show how a 
fragmented, polycentric system composed of multiple centers nested in two larger ideological camps 
                                                          
3 For details, see https://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan (Accessed 8 May 2019).  
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increasingly polarized and homogenized into a system with two ideological centers and minimal 
belief overlap. The analysis demonstrates how actors from the subnational level were initially absent 
in this national-level policy arena and increasingly played a role in polarizing the two centers around 
the issue of the Clean Power Plan. These results can be characterized as an instance of a polycentric 
system that led to policy blockage, rather than innovation, through the multi-level activation of new 
actors, by means of polarization of the centers.  
 
Conclusion: Polycentricity in Climate Networks 
The results of this analysis clearly show how diverse actors worked together to promote their 
positions on the issue of climate change in the United States.  As some governmental actors 
disengaged from climate discussions after the failure of the cap-and-trade bill, space opened up for 
other types of actors to participate in Congressional Hearings around the issue.  Moreover, in the 
113th and 114th Sessions, subnational actors became quite vocal about their views, many of whom 
were against states implementing the Clean Power Plan when it was proposed.  In fact, before the 
Trump Administration took office (and subsequently repealed the Clean Power Plan), the Plan had 
been challenged in more than half of the 50 states in the United States and the Supreme Court had 
halted implementation of the Plan until cases in the lower courts were settled.4 
In other words, these results clearly illustrate a polycentric approach to climate politics in the 
United States, with a participation of actors from multiple levels and actor types. Although the 
research on this subject has focused most of its attention on how polycentric governance can 
facilitate policies that encourage reductions in greenhouse gases (see particularly Cole 2015, Gillard 
et al. 2017; Jordan et al. 2018; Ostrom 2012), our case illustrates the ways that polycentricity can be 
                                                          
4  Details available at: http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (accessed 27 
January 2018). 
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used to block the implementation of such efforts.   These findings add to the literature on 
polycentricity by illustrating how such collaboration by national and subnational actors at multiple 
levels and centers of the political sphere can work against, rather than in favor of, policy change that 
favors environmental outcomes. To restate, our results provide clear challenges to the predominant 
view in the literature that polycentric governance necessarily favors progressive outcomes. 
Hence, this paper provides a first step towards understanding polycentricity that stagnates 
policy innovation.  Future research should focus on fleshing out how a polycentric approach fits 
within both policy innovation and policy stagnation.  In addition, future research should apply the 
polycentric approach to environmental issues beyond climate change, and even perhaps beyond 
environmental issues. We should note that in unpacking the black box of relationships between 
actors and centers in polycentric governance systems, our analysis is confined to ideological 
networks as one specific layer of relations and does not consider bargaining processes and 
coordination through policy forums as in the Ecology of Games literature. Although our approach 
provides an innovative view on polycentric governance, it should be complemented by these 
additional perspectives in future research to understand the innovative and stagnating mechanisms 
in polycentric systems more fully. 
Methodologically, the present contribution employed mostly exploratory (discourse) network 
analysis. Future research should extend these descriptions and employ statistical network models to 
test hypotheses on network formation. Such analysis must be done in tandem with better theory 
development on how and why actors link to certain policy belief concepts – intrinsically or in 
response to the revealed positions of other actors –, and how and why political actors link to certain 
policy forums at any point in time. We anticipate that a multiplex view of these networks across 
multiple relations, node types, and levels holds both theoretical and empirical promise for 
developing a better understanding of how polycentricity works in practice. 
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In terms of climate politics in the US, this paper provides evidence that policy actors outside 
the federal government have engaged in climate politics at multiple scales.  Our analysis has 
documented how the Clean Power Plan was blocked in the US Congress and what role subnational 
actors took in this process. This paper provides a rare case in which policy blockage can be 
documented empirically. Polycentric governance played a key role in this process. Future research 
should dig more deeply into how subnational actors are addressing (or refrain from addressing) 
climate politics and other environmental politics at the federal or subnational levels. 
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TABLE 1:  PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS BY ACTOR TYPE 
 112th Session 113th Session 114th Session 
 2011-2013 
Democratic Senate, 
Republican House 
2013-2015 
Democratic Senate, 
Republican House 
2015-2017 
Democratic Senate, 
Republican House 
 n % n % n % 
Business/ Business Associations 
 
18 21.2% 35 17.9% 233 28.8% 
Congressional –Democrats 
 
4 4.7% 21 10.7% 99 12.2% 
 
Congressional –Republicans 
 
3 3.5% 25 12.8% 120 14.8% 
Environmental Groups 
 
6 7.1% 12 6.1% 36 4.4% 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
7 8.2% 15 7.7% 86 10.6% 
 
Scientists/Academics 
 
25 29.4% 29 14.8% 57 7.0% 
Subnational Governmental 
Representatives 
 
6 7.1% 23 11.7% 72 8.9% 
US Administration Representatives 
 
16 18.8% 34 17.3% 93 11.5% 
Other 
 
0 0.0% 2 1.0% 14 1.7% 
TOTAL 85  196  810 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ideological Climate Network in 112th, 113th , and 114th Sessions of Congress 
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Figure 2: Actors’ positive (green), negative (red), or ambiguous (blue) affiliation with policy 
beliefs in 112th and 113th Sessions of Congress 
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Figure 3: Same as Figure 2 with sub-governmental actors highlighted in 113th and 114th   
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Figure 4: Actor congruence networks in 112th, 113th, and 114th Sessions of Congress, without 
science-related policy beliefs 
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